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ARGUMENT
POINT I
MR. KEARNS' INABILITY TO ANSWER THE
COMPLAINT WAS DUE TO EXCUSABLE
NEGLECT
Wells Fargo claims that Mr. Kearns "made a conscious decision to not answer the
Complaint and knowingly accepted the consequences." Br. of Appellee p. 18. In support
of this factually unsupported assertion, Wells Fargo launches into a personal attack on Mr.
Kearns' integrity by questioning whether Mr. Kearns' son was in fact ill, draws attention to
the trivial distinction between "several" days and three days, and imputes knowledge of the
Complaint between unrelated firms on matters that are beyond the scope of
representation.
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Wells Fargo attacks Mr. Kearns' integrity by questioning whether Mr. Kearns' son
was even ill. By affidavit, both Miriam Kearns and Mr. Kearns testified that their newborn
suffered from severe allergies and complications with his digestive system (R. 95-100).
Each of the ailments Mr. Kearns' son suffered was life threatening.

It is not only

inappropriate, but also distasteful, for Wells Fargo to question whether Mr. Kearns'son was
in fact ill.
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Wells Fargo even goes to the extent of misconstruing case law to suggest that
"inconvenience or press of personal or business affairs does not constitute excusable
neglect." Br. of Appellee at 19, fn. 1. In Valley Leasing v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 (Utah
1983), the Court stated m]ere inconvenience or the press of personal or business affairs
is not deemed as an excuse for failure to appear at trial." Id. at 960 (citing Peterson v.

1

Crosier, 81 P. 860 (1905)). Contrary to Wells Fargo's interpretation of the Valley Leasing
v. Houghton decision, presenting an excuse for failure to appear at trial is not equated with
demonstrating excusable neglect for purposes of setting aside a default judgment.
Additionally, Wells Fargo questions Mr. Kearns' integrity on the basis of the
distinction between "several" days and three days. Paragraph 4 of Mr. Kearns' Affidavit
provides: "Once Mrs. Kearns alerted me to the Complaint, I failed to file an answer or bring
it to my attorney's attention due to my own preoccupation with my son's condition." (R. 96)
Wells Fargo alleges that this statement is false given Mr. Kearns' Affidavit submitted in
conjunction with his Trust dispute, dated August 26,1999. This distinction is trivial, at best
and does not amount to an inaccurate statement. Several is commonly understood to
consist of an indefinitely smalt number that is more than two but less than many. Given the
widely used and accepted meaning of the word "several," Mr. Kearns correctly articulated
the facts in paragraph 4 of his Affidavit.
•

Similarly, Wells Fargo alleges that Mr. Kearns' statement that he failed to bring the

Complaint to his attorney's attention is false. Wells Fargo misconstrues the fact that Mr.
Kearns informed the attorneys at Kirton & McConkie, who represented Mr. Kearns in the
Thomas Kearns Trust Action, and equates that with informing his attorneys at Larsen &
Mooney Law, the only firm he retained to represent him in matters stemming from the entry
of the Default Judgment.

In the Thomas Kearns Trust Action only, Mr. Kearns was

represented by Eric C. Olson ("Mr. Olson") and Matthew K. Richards ("Mr. Richards") of
Kirton & McConkie. That firm has never been retained in nor asked to represent Mr.
Kearns in this matter.

In the present litigation, Jerome H. Mooney ("Mr. Mooney") and
2

Mark A. Larsen ("Mr. Larsen") of Larsen & Mooney Law represent Mr. Kearns. Neither Mr,
Mooney nor Mr. Larsen communicated with Mr. Olspn or Mr. Richards regarding this
Complaint, and neither firm is imputed with knowledge that is beyond the scope of their
representation.
In short, rather than address the substantive issue of whether Mr. Kearns
demonstrated excusable neglect, Wells Fargo chose to launch an unfounded personal
attack on Mr. Kearns' integrity.
POINT II
MR. KEARNS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS TIMELY
PURSUANT TO RULE 58A Of THE UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Wells Fargo's argument that Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment is untimely is without merit and is unsupported by the record below. Rule
58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
When judgment entered; notation in
register of actions and judgment docket.
Ajudgment is complete and shall be deemed
entered for all purposes . . . when the same
is signed and filed as herein above
provided. The clerk shall immediately make
a notation of the Judgment in the register of
actions and the judgment docket.
(Emphasis added) U.R.C.P. 58A(c)(1999).
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Under Rule 58A(c) "a judgment is

complete and deemed entered for all purposes when the same is signed and filed."

3

In re Bundy's Estate v. Bundy, 241 P.2d 462, 467 (Utah 1952).
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The court docket in this case reflects that even though Judge Peuler signed
the Default Judgment on September 23, 1999, it was not filed by Judge Peuler's
clerk nor entered into the registry of judgments until September 27, 1999.
Considering that the Default Judgment was not deemed "entered" pursuant
to Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure until September 27, 1999, Mr.
Kearns had until December 27, 1999, to file a motion to set aside the entry of
default. Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed on December
27,1999, and, therefore, within the three-month time period required under U.R.C.P.
Rule 60(b).1
Wells Fargo's argument thatthe language of Rule 58A suggests that "once the
Judge signs the Judgment and gives it to the court clerk (i.e., files it) that it is a final
judgment regardless of when it is entered in the register of actions and the judgment
docket" is not supported by any case law and contrary to U.R.C.P. 58A(c).
In addition to the fact that Wells Fargo's timeliness issue lacks merit and is not
supported by the record, Wells Fargo incorrectly suggests that the timeliness issue
--1
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1

Section 30-3-7 of the Utah Code lends further support for Mr. Kearns position.
Utah Code Anno. § 30-3-7(1 )(a)(1994) provides, in pertinent part, that a decree of divorce
becomes absolute: "[0]n the date it is signed by the court and entered by the clerk in the
register of actions. . . ."
4

was not a basis of the trial court's ruling. (Br. of Appellee p. 14) The timeliness
^

issue was

ecificaily addressed in Mr. Kearns' Objection to Wells Fargo's Proposed

Orders (R. 209-222) and in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s Response to Mr. Kearns'
Objection to Wells Fargo Bank's Proposed Orders (R. 223-?31).2
Wells Fargo submitted two proposed orders and Mr. Kearns objected to the
proposed orders because: (1) Wells Fargo's proposed order including an award of
o
attorneys' fees was not in conformity with the trial court's ruling because Wells Fargo
was not awarded any attorney's fees; (2) Wells Fargo's proposed Order containing
O

attorneys' fees were clearly in excess of a reasonable fee; (3) Pursuant to U.R.C.P,
58A, Mr, Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was timely considering, the
Default Judgment was signed by Judge Peuler on September 23, 1999, but it was
neither filea by Judge Peuler's clerk nor entered into the Registry of Judgments until
September 27, 1999.
After considering the arguments advanced by the parties, Judge Peuler
agreed with Mr. Kearns1 position as evidenced by the fact she signed the Order

°

Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment which did not include

2

u

Wells Fargo's Proposed Orders are attached as Addendum No. 1, Mr. Kearns'
Objection to Wells Fargo Bank's Proposed Orders is attached as Addendum No. 2, and
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s Response to Michael J. Kearns' Objects m to Wells Fargo Bank's
proposed Orders is attached as Addendum No. 3.
5
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an award of attorneys' fees, combined with the in%lmeated changes she made on
the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (R. 242).
Paragraph 1 of the signed Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment provides'

-

On December 27, 1999, Defendant filed a Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment which Judgment was signed by
> this Court September23,1999, and tjjed on September
27, 1999. Defendant's Motion was accompanied by a
supporting Memorandum of Defendant Michael Kearns. .->

(Emphasis added to designate Judge Peuler's interlineations)3
Accordingly, Wells Fargo's statement that the timeliness issue was not a basis
of the Trial Court's decision is clearly erroneous and designed to mislead this Court.
—

-r -

POINT III

- -

WELLS FARGO MISCONSTRUED THE
APPLICABLE STANDARD O F REVIEW
FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A
DEFENSE IS MERITORIOUS
Wells Fargo mischaracterized thisCourt'sdecision in Black's Title, Inc v. Utah
State Ins. Dep't, 991 P.2d 607 (Utah Ct. App 199ft), to suggest that the applicable
standard of review in determining whether a defense |S meritorious is really an abuse
of discretion. Wells Fargo misconstrued this Court's decision in Black's Title and
suggested that "this particular correctness standard has been applied so the Trial
3

A copy of the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
is attached as Addendum No. 4

6

Court's decision will not be interfered with unless there is a clear showing of an
abuse of its considerable discretion." Br. of Appellee at 3. *••?- ~r *
Contrary to the present appeal, the parties in Black's Title did not dispute "that
Black made a timely motion and asserted a meritorious defense." Black's Title, Inc.
v. Utah State Ins. Dep% 991 P.2d at 610. The sole purpose of the review in Black's
Title was to determine whether the "Commissioner erred in concluding that Black's
default did not occur for reasons described in Rule 60(b)." Id. Given that the only
issue involved on appeal was whether Black's default was due to excusable neglect,
the appellate court was reviewing a question of fact and accordingly the applicable
standard of review was abuse of discretion.
If the sole issue in the present appeal was whether Mr. Kearns demonstrated
excusable neglect, or defaulted for one of the other reasons described in Rule 60(b),
then the applicable standard of review would be abuse of discretion. However, given
that the parties in the subject appeal dispute whether Mr. Kearns' Rule 60(b) motion
was timely, demonstrated excusable neglect, and that he had a meritorious defense,
the standard of review articulated by this Court in Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins.
Dep't does not provide any guidance for the standard of review when determining
the specific issue of whether a defense is meritorious, which presents a question of

7

Court's decision will not be interfered with unless there is a clear showing of an
abuse of its considerable discretion." Br. of Appellee at 3.
Contrary to the present appeal, the parties in Black's Title did not dispute "that
Black made a timely motion and asserted a meritorious defense." Black's Title, Inc.
v. Utah State Ins. Dep't, 991 P.2d at 610. The sole purpose of the review in Black's
Title was to determine whether the "Commissioner erred in concluding that Black's
default did not occur for reasons described in Rule 60(b)." Id. Given that the only
issue involved on appeal was whether Black's default was due to excusable neglect,
the appellate court was reviewing a question of fact and accordingly the applicable
standard of review was abuse of discretion.

._<"••

If the sole issue in the present appeal was whether Mr. Kearns demonstrated
excusable neglect, or defaulted for one of the other reasons described in Rule 60(b),
then the applicable standard of review would be abuse of discretion. However, given
that the parties in the subject appeal dispute whether Mr. Kearns' Rule 60(b) motion
was timely, demonstrated excusable neglect, and that he had a meritorious defense,
the standard of review articulated by this Court in Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins.
Dep't does not provide any guidance for the standard of review when determining

7

the specific issue o^ vhether a defense is meritorious, which presents a question of
law.4

1 \' :. ±• -.r .

Wells Fargo's statement of the applicable standard of review for determining
whether a defense is meritorious is inherently incompatible and contrary to the Utah
Supreme Court's designation of this issue as a question of law. In State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court clarified the distinction between
the standard of review for issues of fact and questions of law:
When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of
law, however, the standard of review is not phrased as
•Mbnc-itfbfcTt- "clearly erroneous." Rather, appellate review of a trial
court's determination of the law is usually characterized by
the term "correctness." Controlling Utah case law teaches
that "correctness" means that the appellate court decides
the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to
the trial judge's determination of law. State v. Deli, 861
J
. , ;tc -SV ,,, P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); see Kennecott Corp. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 13841,1383 (Utah 1993). This is
- '<u .
because appellate courts have traditionally been seen as
having the power and duty to say what the law is and to
V
H : ••£!
ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.
Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of
• * Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779 (1957); see
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993), In
otherwords, one can visualize the traditional standard-ofreview scheme as a continuum of deference anchored at

4

r
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Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986), does not lend any support for Wells
Fargo's interpretation of the applicable standard of review. The Katz decision preceded
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Erickson by eight years. For obvious reasons, the
precedent set forth in Erickson provides controlling authority and dictates that the
applicable standard of review for deciphering whether a defense is meritorious is a
question of law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness.
8

V '

either end by the clearly erroneous and correction-of-error
standards, which correspond with whether the issue is
characterized as one of fact or of law.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936.
-

••

•- . .

In Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994),

the Utah Supreme Court clearly articulated the applicable standard of review for
determining whether a defense is meritorious. "[T]he proper legal standard to be
used by trial courts in determining whether a defense is meritorious is a question
of law, which we review for correctness." Id. at 1148 (Emphasis added)(citing
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)("Appellate courts have traditionally
been seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that
it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction)).

r

^.

-^'

- *•

In summary, whether a defense is meritorious is a question of law, which the
appellate court reviews for correctness. Wells Fargo's contention that the applicable
standard of review is abuse of discretion is unsupported by Utah case law and
inherently incompatible. Mr. Kearns's meritorious defense is described in detail in
the Brief of Appellant of Michael J. Kearns at 14-15.

.<>
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POINT IV
PURSUANT TO RULE 24(a)(7) OF THE
UTAH
RULES
OF
APPELLATE
PROCEDURE, MR. KEARNS SET FORTH
A STATEMENT OF FACTS WITHIN HIS
pESCRIPTION OF THE COURSE OF
PROCEEDINGS
Contrary to Wells Fargo's accusation that Mr. Kearns failed to set forth a
statement of facts as required by U.R.C.P Rule 27(a)(7), which obviously is an
incorrect reference, Mr. Kearns' Brief included a statement of facts, contained in hi£
description of the course of proceedings, which referenced the proceedings below"
and were supported with citations to the record. U.R.A.P. Rule 24(a) addresses the
form and content for appellant's brief. Rule 24(a)(7) provides:

r

(t

A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate
briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings,
and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
follow. All statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the
record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.

U.R.A.P. 24(a)(7).
Mr. Kearns concedes that his Brief did not include a separately designated
statement of the facts, but it did include a recitation of the relevant facts in his
description of the course of proceedings. Mr. Kearns's facts correctly referenced the
proceedings below and were supported with citations to the record.
L_-
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In addition to falsely accusing Mr. Kearns of omitting a statement of facts,
paragraph 14 of Wells Fargo's recitation of the facts is not supported by the record.
The Default Judgment was signed by Judge Sandra Peuler on September 23,1999,
but was not fifed by the clerk nor entered into the Registry of Judgments until
September 27, 1999. (R. 242) The trial court docket further supports Mr. Kearns'
position that the Judgment was not filed by the clerk, nor entered into the Registry
of Judgments until September 27, 1999.5
In short, Wells Fargo falsely accused Mr. Kearns of failing to set forth a
statement of facts and paragraph 14 of Wells Fargo's recitation of the facts is not
supported by the record.
POINT V
MR. KEARNS' APPEAL IS WORTHY OF
CONSIDERATION AND SHOULD NOT BE
SUBJECT TO THE CHILLING EFFECT OF
RULE 33(a) SANCTIONS
•-

~

•

'

J *

.-

.

Contrary to Wells Fargo's claim, Mr. Kearns' appeal is grounded in fact,
warranted by existing law, and was not submitted for purposes of delay. In other
words, Mr. Kearns' appeal is worthy of consideration and should not be subject to
Rule 33(a) sanctions. Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides,
in pertinent part:
5

„..-- • -, "

.
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A copy of the court docket is attached as Addendum No. 5.
11
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[I]f the court determines that a motion made
or appeal taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double
costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing
party. The court may order that the damages
be paid by the party or by the party's
attorney.
U.R.A.P. 33(a)(1999). Subsection (b) defines the critical terms of frivolous and for
delay as follows:
For purposes of these rules, a frivolous
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper interposed for the purpose of
delay is one interposed for any improper
purpose such as to harass, cause needless
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time
that will benefit only the party filing the
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
U.R.A.P. 33(b)(1999).
Sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be imposed in egregious cases,
to avoid chilling the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions. However, Rule
33(a) sanctions should be imposed when an appeal is obviously without any merit
and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Porco v. Porco, 752
P.2d 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App.

12

1989); see also Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Mr. Kearns' appeal should be granted.

It is not an egregious case that

warrants Rule 33(a) sanctions. Mr. Kearns' appeal is meritorious, factually based,
and warranted by existing law. Moreover, Mr. Kearns' appeal was not filed for
purposes of delay. Mr. Kearns has clearly demonstrated a proper motivation for
filing this appeal; Mr. Kearns has counterclaims against Wells Fargo stemming from
this dispute which may be precluded under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral
estoppel if the default judgment is not set aside. 6
Wells Fargo's request for Rule 33(a) sanctions is yet another example of its
repeated attempt to improperly collect costs and attorneys' fees from Mr. Kearns.
Illustrative of this point is the fact that Wells Fargo improperly submitted an Order to
the Trial Court including an award of attorneys' fees despite the fact that Judge
Peuler's Court's Minute Entry did not award any attorneys' fees (R. 238-40).

•1)
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Several policy arguments favorthe view that default judgments should not be given
collateral estoppel/res judicata effect: (1) to do so misconceives the nature of default
judgment, which "only admits for the purpose of the action the legality of the demand or
claim in suit: and "does no make the allegations of the . . . complaint evidence in an action
upon a different claim." Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 356 (1877); (2) the
defendant should not be compelled to defend a suit which he otherwise would choose not
to defend because of fear of its effect on future litigation; and (3) application of collateral
estoppel in a default situation is unjust if it cannot b$ said that the parties could have
reasonably foreseen the conclusive effect of their actions. These policy concerns are
applicable to the present case.

13

Wells Fargo's improper tactics should not be condoned. Accordingly, this
C jrt should find that Mr. Kearns' appeal is worthy of consideration and should not
be subject to Rule 33(a) sanctions.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
should be reversed and remanded, with instructions to set aside the default
judgment and allow Mr. Kearns an opportunity to file an Answer or other appropriate
response.
Dated: August 9, 2000.
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW

m
i. Mantas
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

14
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I certify that on August 10, 2000, two true and correct copies of the foregoing
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT MICHAEL J. KEARNS were mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
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Mark S. Swan
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
'' • '
"V.

Plaintiff,
['-

.

i) • ->£ ^ O K

Jit t,'!5. ".

' '

M,f

T

•

?

Civil No. 990908206
MICHAEL J. KEARNS,
Defendant.

Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment came before this Court as a result of the
parties' Notice to Submit. Plaintiff filed a principal Memorandum and Affidavit, Defendant filed
a Responsive Memorandum and Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum. Though oral argument was
requested, the Court finds that oral argument would not substantially assist the Court in making a
ruling on Defendant's Motion. Therefore, the Court having fully reviewed Defendant's Motion and
the resulting pleadings, along with the Court record in this matter, the Court hereby enters the
following ruling:

00_37073CECwpd

1.

On December 27,1999, Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment,

which Judgment was signed by this Court December 23, 1999.

Defendant's Motion was

accompanied by a supporting Memorandum of Defendant Michael Keams.
2.

Defendant asserted that his failure to respond to Plaintiffs Complaint in a timely

fashion was due to excusable neglect as that term is set forth in Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

, .

3-

Defendant has failed to show excusable neglect.

4.

Defendant has further failed to show that he has a meritorious defense to the matters

raised in Plaintiff s Complaint. Particularly, the Defendant' s chim that the matter should have been
arbitrated is not persuasive as the arbitration provision under the Note sued upon by Plaintiff
required a formal election of arbitration to be made by Defendant before the Court in the civil action,
which did not occur in this case.
5.

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment is Denied.

6.

Defendant's Motion having been brought without merit and contrary to the facts

known to Defendant, and therefore being in bad faith, entitles Plaintiff to its attorney's fees in the
sum of $5,404.00, which are hereby awarded to Plaintiff a.s an additional Judgment against
Defendant.
DATED this

'
day of February, 2000.

:

'

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE SANDRA N. PEULER
Third Judicial District Court Judge
00_37073 CEC wpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

fp day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and unsigned correct

copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
Mark A. Larsen
Jerome H. Mooney III
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

A

-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and signed correct

copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
M a r k A. Larsen
' JJ'-^-'
Jerome H. Mooney III
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
•

"•<-'

"•
•'

'!

Mark S. Swan
'\
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047-4139
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MarkS. Swan-3873
Shane W. Norris - 8097
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 561-4750
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Wells Fargo Bank, NA.
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 990908206
MICHAEL J. KEARNS,
Defendant.

" "
Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment came before this Court as a result of the
parties' Notice to Submit. Plaintiff filed a principal Memorandum and Affidavit, Defendant filed .
a Responsive Memorandum and Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum. Though oral argument was >
requested, the Court finds that oral argument would not substantially assist the Court in making a
ruling on Defendant's Motion. Therefore, the Court having fully reviewed Defendant's Motion and
the resulting pleadings, along with the Court record in this matter, the Court hereby enters the
following ruling:

00_37266.CEC.wpd

1.

On December 27,1999, Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment,

which Judgment was signed by this Court December 23, 1999.

Defendant's Motion was

accompanied by a supporting Memorandum of Defendant Michael Kearns.
2.

Defendant asserted that his failure to respond to Plaintiffs Complaint in a timely

fashion was due to excusable neglect as that term is set forth in Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
3.

Defendant has failed to show excusable neglect.

4.

Defendant has further failed to show that he has a meritorious defense to the matters

raised in Plaintiffs Complaint.
5.

v

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment is Denied.

DATED this

day of February, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE SANDRA N. PEULER
Third Judicial District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

2,3 day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and unsigned correct

copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid and addressed as follows:

".':-

Mark A. Larsen
Jerome H. Mooney III
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

" -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and signed correct

copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
Mark A. Larsen
Jerome H. Mooney III
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Mark S. Swan
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450
Mid vale, Utah 84047-4139
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Tab 2

MARK A. LARSEN(3727)
JEROME H. MOONEY 111 (2303)
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801)364-6500

©FY

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
MR. KEARNS' OBJECTION TO
WELLS FARGO BANK'S PROPOSED
^ ORDERS

Plaintiff,
v

(Oral Argument Requested)

-

MICHAEL J. KEARNS,
Civil No. 990908206

Defendant.
"•

' V'°

Judge Sandra Peuler

-

'

Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Defendant
Michael J. Kearns ("Mr. Kearns") submits the foliowing Objection to Wells Fargo Bank's
Proposed Orders:
INTRODUCTION

-

On February 10, 2000, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") submitted
a proposed Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, and
simultaneously submitted an alternative proposed order which included an award of

attorneys' fees despite the fact that this Court's Minute Entry did not award attorneys' fees.
A copy of the Court's Minute Entry, dated January 31, 2000, is attached as Exhibit A.
Not only is it improper for Wells Fargo to submit an Order including attorneys' fees,
considering that it is not in conformity with this Court's ruling, the amount requested is
clearly in excess of a reasonable fee.
Additionally, Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 1 because the Default Judgment was
signed by this Court on September 23, 1999, not December 23, 1999, as stated in
paragraph 1 of the proposed Orders. Further, paragraph 1 should reflect, in accordance
with the court docket in this case, that the Default Judgment was not filed until September
27,1999. A copy of the relevant portion of the court docket in the present case is attached
as Exhibit B.

A

,

:,

Moreover, Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 4 on the basis that Mr. Kearns was not
required to formally elect binding arbitration of this dispute. Rather, the Binding Arbitration
provision expressly provided that all disputes were required to be resolved by binding
arbitration rather than in court. Further, Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 4 because he
does in fact have a meritorious defense predicated upon lender liability, which if
successful, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one entered against him.
Accordingly, Mr. Kearns objects to the proposed Orders Denying Defendant's
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I

O

WELLS FARGO's PROPOSED ORDER INCLUDING AN
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS NOT IN CONFORMITY
WITH THIS COURT'S RULING BECAUSE WELLS FARGO '
WAS NOT AWARDED ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides, in pertinent Dart:
"In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party
.. obtaining the ruling shall... file with the court
a proposed order . . . in conformity with the
ruling."
(Emphasis added).
Wells Fargo's proposed Order including attorney's fees is not in conformity with this
Court's ruling. This Court ruled, in its Minute Entry, dated January 31, 2000, "[t]he

,

t

defendant's Motion is denied for the reasons and upon the bases as set forth in plaintiff's
Memorandum." The ruling did not award Wells Fargo its attorneys' fees and is silent as
to Plaintiffs procedurally improper request for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah

°

Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells Fargo's request for Rule 11 sanctions against Mr. Kearns was without merit
•

*-«

and procedurally improper under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11(1)(A) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be
made separately from other motions or
requests and shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It
shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall
not be filed with or presented to the court
3

unless, within 21 days after service of the
motion (or such other period as the court may
prescribe), the challenged paper, ciaim, defense,
contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn
or appropriately corrected.
(Emphasis added) U.R.C.P. 11(1)(A)(1999).
Wells Fargo improperly combined its Memorandum in Opposition to Mr. Kearns'
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment with its Request for Attorneys' Fees. Additionally,
Wells Fargo immediately filed the motion with this Court rather than waiting the mandatory
21-day time period. Given these significant deficiencies, combined with the fact that the
Court's ruling does not include an award of attorneys' fees, it is absurd for Wells Fargo to
submit the proposed Order including attorneys' fees.
Wells Fargo's proposed Order, containing an award of attorneys' fees, is yet another
example of its repeated tactics to harass Mr. Kearns. This Court should not condone this
harassment and should sustain Mr. Kearns' objections to the proposed Order containing
an award of attorneys' fees.

,

-..---'
POINT II

IN ADDITION TO FAILING TO CONFORM
WITH THIS COURT'S RULING, WELLS
FARGO'S PROPOSED ORDER CONTAINING
ATTORNEYS' FEES IS CLEARLY IN EXCESS
OF A REASONABLE FEE
Wells Fargo's proposed Order, containing attorneys' fees, requests attorneys' fees
and costs in the sum of $5,404.00. This amount is clearly excessive. Rule 1.5 of the

4

Rules of Professional Conduct requires attorneys to charge reasonable fees for the
services rendered. Rule 1.5(a) provides, in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for,
charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive
fee. A fee is clearly excessive when, after a
review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary
prudence would be left with a definite and firm
conviction that the fee is in excess of a
reasonable fee. , Factors to be considered as
guides in determining the reasonableness of the .
fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the
- -* novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved and the skill requisite to perform
the legal service properly . . . .

:

R. of Prof I Conduct 1.5(a).
Wells Fargo's attorney expended a total of 39.80 hours to prepare a memorandum
in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. This is not a
reasonable amount of time for such legal services. A lawyer of ordinary prudence would
conclude that the time Wells Fargo's counsel spent on preparing this memorandum was
not reasonable. Additionally, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would conclude that $31.00
for certified copies was both unreasonable and unnecessary.

.<

i

*

POINT III
WELL$ FARGO's PROPOSED ORDERS CONTAINS
FACTUALLY INCORRECT STATEMENTS TO WHICH MR.
KEARNS OBJECTS
A,

Mr. Kearns Specifically Objects to the Factually Incorrect Statements in
Paragraph 1 of Wells Fargo's Proposed Orders
Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 1 because the Default Judgment was signed by

this Court on September 23,1999, not December 23,1999, as stated in paragraph 1 of the
proposed Orders.
Further, paragraph 1 should reflect, in accordance with the court docket in this case,
thatthe Default Judgment was not ff/ed until September 27,1999. Rule 58A(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
When judgment entered; notation in register of
actions and judgment docket. A judgment is
complete and shall be deemed entered for all
purposes .. .when the same is signed and filed
§s herein above provided. The clerk shall
immediately make a notation of the Judgment in
the register of actions and the judgment docket.
(Emphasis added)

U.R.C.P.

~'
~'

"

-

58A(c)(1999). Under Rule 58A(c) "a judgment is complete

and deemed entered for all purposes when the same is signed and filed." In re Bundy's
Estate v. Bundy\ 241 p.2d 462, 467 (Utah 1952).
The court docket in this case reflects that even though Judge Peuler signed the
Default Judgment on September 23, 1999, it was not filed by Judge Peuler's clerk nor
entered into the registry of judgments until September 27, 1999.

6

Considering that the Default Judgment was not deemed "entered" pursuant to Rule
O

58Aofthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure until September 27, 1999, Mr, Kearns had until
December 27, 1999, to file a motion to set aside the entry of default. Mr. Kearns' Motion
to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed on December 27,1999, and, therefore, within the

O
three month time period required under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
B.

Mr. Kearns Specifically Objects to the Factually Incorrect Statements in
Paragraph 4 of Wells Fargo's Proposed Orders
First, Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 4 of Wells Fargo's proposed Orders on the

basis that the Binding Arbitration provision contained in the Loan Agreement did not require
Mr. Kearns to formally elect binding arbitration. Instead, the Binding Arbitration provision
expressly provided that the only form of dispute resolution these parties agreed to was
binding arbitration.
t'

The Loan Agreement contains the following binding arbitration

provision:
(1) Binding Arbitration. You agree that any Dispute not
resolved informally, regardless of when it arose, will be settled
in accordance with the terms of the Arbitration Program at the
election of any party. A "Dispute" shall include any dispute, ;
claim or controversy of any kind involving you or us, whether
in contract or in tort, legal or equitable, now existing or
hereafter arising, relating in any way to this Agreement or any
related agreements (the "Documents"), or any past, present or •
future loans, services, agreements, relationships, incidents or
injuries of any kind whatsoever relating to or involving the
Private Banking Group or any successor group or department
of Lender. Any party to a Dispute may by summary ,
proceeding bring any action in court to compel arbitration of
any Dispute. Any party who fails to submit to binding
arbitration following a lawful demand by the opposing party
shall bear all costs and expenses incurred by the opposing
party in compelling arbitration of any Dispute. The parties
agree that by engaging in activities with or involving each other
7

as described above, they are participating in transactions
involving interstate commerce. THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND
THAT THEIR DISPUTES SHALL BE RESOLVED BY
BINDING ARBITRATION RATHER THAN IN COURT, AND
ONCE DECIDED BY ARBITRATION NO DISPUTE CAN
LATER BE BROUGHT, FILED OR PURSUED IN COURT
BEFORE A JUDGE OR JURY.
Secondly, Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 4 because he does in fact have a
meritorious defense predicated upon lender liability which, if successful, would have
resulted in a judgment different that the one entered against him. The lead opinion in
Musselman held, "A meritorious defense is one which sets forth specific and sufficiently
detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one
entered."

State ex rel. Dep't of Soc. Serv.v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah

1983)(plurality opinion)(quoting Lopez v. Reserve Ins. Co., 525 P.2d 1204,1206 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1974).
Although Mr. Kearns has never refuted that he owed Wells Fargo $250,000.00, plus
interest, he does dispute the Wells Fargo's choice of venue as well as the attorneys' fees
and court costs. Further, the amount of money Mr. Kearns owed to Wells Fargo may be
offset in whole or in part, or may even be exceeded, by Mr. Kearns's lender liability claims
against Wells Fargo.

*• : . i

•

'•'• '

• • =
CONCLUSION
~

,^V

'

.

s"

^ •

Mr. Kearns objects to Wells Fargo's proposed Orders for the following reasons:
>

Wells Fargo's proposed Order including attorneys' fees is not in conformity
with this Court's ruling;
—_

' -
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' >

-^

>

Weils Fargo's proposed Order containing attorneys' fees is clearly in excess
of a reasonable fee;

>

Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 1 because the Default Judgment was
signed by this Court on September 23, 1999, not December 23, 1999, as
stated in paragraph 1 of the proposed Orders;

>

Paragraph 1 should reflect, in accordance with the court docket in this case,
'"

>

that the Default Judgment was not filed until September 27, 1999;
Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 4 of Wells Fargo's proposed Orders on the
basis that the Binding Arbitration provision contained in the Loan Agreement
did not require Mr. Kearns to formally elect binding arbitration; and

>

Mr. Kearns further objects to paragraph 4 because he does in fact have a
meritorious defense predicated upon lender liability, which, if successful,
would have resulted in a judgment different that the one entered against him.

9

- REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Mr. Kearns
requests oral argument on his Objection to Weils Fargo Bank's Proposed Orders.
Dated: February 17,2000.

' "*

'

LARSEN & MOONEY LAW

&l#k-

lark_A. Larsen
Jerome H. Mooney
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
f certify that on February 17, 2000, a true ancf correct copy of MR. KEARNS'
OBJECTION TO WELLS FARGO BANK'S PROPOSED ORDERS was mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Mark S. Swan
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047

o > -
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
*»;n

IK AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

V:\
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

990908206

Submit

for Decision

vs.
MICHAEL J. KEARNS,
Defendant.

Before

the

Court

is a Notice

to

on

defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. The Court having
reviewed

the

pleadings

filed

in this matter,

now

enters

the

following ruling.
The defendant's Motion is denied for the reasons and upon the
bases as set

forth

in plaintiff's Memorandum.

Although

oral

argument was requested, the Court has reviewed all of the pleadings
filed in connection with this lawsuit and oral argument would not
substantially assist the Court in rendering its ruling.
Counsel

for

plaintiff

is

directed

to

prepare

an

Order

consistent with this ruling.
Dated this ?) I day of January, 2000.

SANDRA N. PEULFR
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

EXHIBIT

A

WELLS FARGO V. KEARNS

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

o
MAILING CERTIFICATE

o

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this_|

day of .January,

2000:

o

o

Mark S. Swan
Shane W. Norris
Attorneys for Plaintiff
6925 S. Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047

O

Mark A. Larsen
Jerome H. Mooney III
Attorneys for Defendant
50 W. Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101

^LCMPU^

3 NUMBER 9 9 0 9 0 8 2 0 6 D e b t CcL_ a c t i o n
Amount C r e d i t :
Balance:

0.00
°-00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT
Amount'Pue:
2 0.00
Amount P a d d :
2 0.00
Amount C r e d i t :
0•°P
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: WRIT OF EXECUTION

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

2 0.00
20.00
°•°°
°- 0 0

-

5E NOTE
JCEEDINGS

-09-99
-13-99
-13-99
-13-99
-13-99
-03-99
-22-99
-22-99
-22-99
-23-99
-23-99
-27-99

-27-99
-30-99

Case filed by jamess
Judge PEULER assigned.
Filed: Complaint 10K-MORE
Fee Account created
Total Due: _
i^u
COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Payment * ecG Jj- ve ^ T ;
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Filed return: Summons (20 day) on return
Party Served: KEARNS, MICHAEL J
Service Date: August 23, 1999
Filed: Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs
Filed: Default Certificate
Default Judgment sent to Judge Peuler
Filed order: Default Judgment
Judge speuler •
Signed September 23, 199S
Case Disposition is Jdmt default clerk
Disposition Judge is SANDRA PEULER
Judgment #1 Entered
Creditor: WELLS FARGO BANK NA
Debtor:
MICHAEL J KEARNS
266,351.85 Principal
5,094.18 Interest
944.00 Attorneys Fee's
272,390.03 Judgment Grand Total
Filed judgment: Default Judgment @
Judge speuler
Signed September 23, 1999
Issued: Abstract of Judgment
Clerk nancyka

:inted: 10/05/99 11:17:43

P*9e
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Tab 3

MarkS. Swan-3873
Shane W. Norris - 8097
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 561-4750
Attorneys for Plaintiff
• Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

•! .<*.

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
Plaintiff,
v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.'s
RESPONSE TO MICHAEL J.
KEARNS' OBJECTION TO WELLS
FARGO BANK'S PROPOSED
ORDERS

MICHAEL J. KEARNS,
Civil No. 990908206
Defendant.
Judge Sandra Peuler
Plaintiff WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") hereby submits the following
Response to Defendant Michael J. Kearns ("Defendant") Obj ection to Wells Fargo Bank's Proposed
Order:
.T

'

INTRODUCTION

.•nl

.'fc

On January 31, 2000, this Court entered a Minute Entry denying Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment. This Court indicated that the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was
denied based upon "the reasons and upon the bases as set forth in plaintiffs Memorandum."

00_37262.CET. wpd

Defendant is attempting to again argue the merits of his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment in
his Objection to Wells Fargo's proposed Orders.

•.' 1

(.»*•"

" i •<

- .-- *- *•

In its original memorandum relied upon by the Court, Wells Fargo set forth three separate
reasons to deny Defendant's Motion to Set Aside. The first was that Defendant's failure to answer
the subject complaint was not due to excusable neglect. The second reason was that Defendant did
not have a meritorious defense to the subject action. The third reason was the Defendant failed to
file the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment within three months in violation of Rule 60(b),
U.R.Civ.P. and even if timely filed, Defendant failed to file the motion within a reasonable time.
The proposed order submitted to this Court accurately reflects the reasons and bases set forth in
Plaintiffs memorandum which were adopted by this Court.
Additionally, Wells Fargo claimed in it's Memorandum that Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment was brought in bad faith and requested an award of attorney's fees and
sanctions based upon Defendant filing a sworn Affidavit which was filled with inaccuracies,
falsifications of facts and outright deception. The Minute Entry did not deny Wells Fargo's request
for attorneys fees, but did not indicate whether attorney's fees were awarded. Therefore, Wells
Fargo submitted two orders to this Court to allow for the award of attorneys fees if this Court
determined sanctions were in order, and in the alternative a separate order not including attorneys.
Plaintiff believes Defendant intentionally attempted to deceive and mislead this Court and an award
of attorneys fees is still appropriate in this matter.
Plaintiff will address Defendant's objections to the proposed form of the Order in
Defendant's order of argument.

00_3726ZCEC.wpd
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ARGUMENT
I.

WELLS FARGO IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES BASED UPON
DEFENDANT'S ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE AND MISLEAD THIS COURT.

While the Court adopted Plaintiffs memorandum in denying Defendant's Motion, the
Minute Entry does not address the attorney's fees requested as a sanction for Defendants attempt to
deceive this Court through his swom affidavit. Therefore, Wells Fargo provided this Court with two
Orders, one including the award of attorneys fees and one excluding the award of attorneys fees.
Defendant is now attempting to argue the merits of the award of attorneys fees after this Court has
already ruled on the failed Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, and is again attempting to mislead
this Court by misrepresenting the substance of Wells Fargo's request for attorneys fees.
Defendant claims that Wells Fargo requested attorneys fees only under Rule 11, and such
request was procedurally improper. In reality, Wells Fargo requested attorneys fees under §78-2756(1) Utah Code Ann.. Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P.. and under this Courts' inherent power to impose
monetary sanctions on a litigant for wasting judicial resources. Although Rule 11 does carry some
procedural aspects with the imposition of attorneys fees, Wells Fargo did not limit its request for
attorneys fees to this rule, and did not indicate in the proposed order that attorneys fees were awarded
under Rule 11. In fact, Wells Fargo indicates in the proposed order that the attorneys fees were
based upon Defendant's Motion having been brought without merit, and contrary to the facts known
to Defendant and in bad faith. Under Utah law, this Court has authority to award attorneys fees
because of Defendant's meritless action.
Not only does this Court has authority to award attorneys fees under §78-27-56(1) Utah Code
Ann-, and Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P.. but also under this Courts' inherent powers to impose monetary
3
00_37262 CEC wpd

J

sanctions for a wasting of judicial resources. The Utah Supreme Court recently held that a judge
"did not purport to act under rule 11, but rather exercised the court's inherent powers to impose
•

""

.

1

-

:

.

.

'

"

•

.

•

monetary sanctions on an attorney for wasting judicial resources when he granted attorney
fees

" Griffith v. Griffith. 376 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (1999) (emphasis added) (holding that

Judge Dever had inherent authority to award attorneys fees outside of Rule 11 because a motion was
without merit). The Utah Supreme Court held that, although Rule 11 sanctions were requested in
the matter, because Judge Dever changed the order to state that the motion was without merit, this
was an exercise of the court's inherent powers to award attorneys fees for sanctions and did not fall
under Rule 11. Id. Therefore, regardless of Defendant's attempt to mislead this Court into believing
that Wells Fargo's request for attorneys fees was procedurally improper, this Court has inherent
authority to award attorneys fees in light of Defendant's egregious behavior, and should do so.
II.

WELLS FARGO's ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED IN OPPOSING
DEFENDANT'S BASELESS AND DECEPTIVE MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ARE REASONABLE.

Defendant claims in his Objection to Wells Fargo Bank's Proposed Orders that the attorneys
fees incurred by Wells Fargo in responding to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
are not reasonable. Plaintiff believes they are reasonable. Although the amount of hours spent
responding to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside are higher than normal for responding to a motion
of this type, Wells Fargo's attorneys were forced to spend an excessive amount of time attempting
to dispute the deceptions which were contained throughout the Motion to Set Aside and the
accompanying Affidavit of Michael Keams. Wells Fargo was forced to obtain numerous pleadings
from a separate action which the current attorneys had no involvement in, and exhaustively restate

00_37262 CEC wpd
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the facts and law to counter the false statements which were throughout Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside. Further, Plaintiff had to present to the Court a five-month course of conduct by Defendant
which was not part of the court record. These efforts were absolutely necessary to provide a true
picture in showing that there was no excusable neglect and no meritorious defense. Defendant's
objection to the costs incurred for certified copies is also meritless, as these copies, which were
provided to the Court, contained the very evidence of Defendant's misrepresentation regarding the
facts.
In light of being forced to dispute numerous inconsistencies and falsehoods which were
contained in Defendant's Motion, Affidavit and Memorandum, the amount of time spent by Wells
Fargo's attorneys in preparing a comprehensive Opposition to the Motion to Set Aside was
reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, this Court should find that fees incurred in this
matter were reasonable.
III.

rt'iOW).

IR31*
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THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS SIGNED BY THIS COURT ON
SEPTEMBER 23,1999.

Defendant's Point III claims that there is a factually incorrect statement in Wells Fargo's
proposed Order. The language in the proposed Order refers to the date that the underlying default
judgment was "signed". There is no reference in the proposed Order to the word "filed". There can
be no dispute that the underlying Default Judgment was in fact signed on September 23,1999, and
the reference in the proposed Order to that date is merely an identification of the Order which
Defendant was moving to set aside. Thus, it is not quite clear why Defendant objects to this
statement in the Order. A finding regarding the timeliness of Defendant's objection was not made
part of the proposed Order. Consequently, Plaintiff believes the Court should ignore this objection
00_3?262.CEC wpd
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by Defendant as being non-meritorious and another attempt by Defendant to deflect this Court from
the simple issues involved in this matter.

- - '•

Notwithstanding this, Defendant's argument with the Oder is also without substantive merit.
Plaintiff believes the default judgment was signed and "filed" by September 23, 1999. Defendant
alleges that the default judgment was not entered into the "registry of judgments" until September
27, 1999. However that has no bearing on when the default judgment was "filed" by this Court'.
Rule 58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure state that "[a] judgment is complete and shall be
deemed entered for all purposes. . . when the same is signed and filed as herein above provided."
The default judgment is stamped as filed by this Court on September 23, 1999. Therefore,
Defendant did not file the Motion to Set Aside within three months as required and this Court could
choose to make that a basis for denying Defendant's Motion.2
IV.

DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO THE
SUBJECT ACTION.
t-r

t*.

\

Defendant is again attempting to argue the merits of his Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment in Objecting to the proposed orders submitted to this Court. As stated above, this Court
indicated in its Minute Order that Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment "is denied for
the reasons and upon the bases set forth in plaintiffs Memorandum." Wells Fargo claimed in the

1

The reference to registry of judgments has been clarified by § 78-22-1.5, Utah Code Ann.,
as the time a judgment becomes a lien on real property as the result of a Judgment Information
Statement. However, for finality purposes, the Default Judgment is entered when stamped by the
court as being filed. Rule 58A(c1. U.R.Civ.P.
2

Defendant correctly points out that Wells Fargo mistakenly stated that the Default Judgment
was signed by this Court on December 23, 1999. Wells Fargo is including a revised Order which
indicates the correct date of September 23, 1999.
00_37262CECwpd
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Opposition to Defendant's Motion that Defendant did not have a meritorious defense to the subject
claim. Since this Court has already found that Defendant does not have a meritorious defense to the
subject claim, Defendant's argument with the Order must be without merit, unless it goes solely to
the form of the Order.
Presumably, Defendant objects to the proposed Order because it makes reference to the
arbitration provision. If this is an unnecessary reference, then Plaintiff has submitted with this
Memorandum proposed Orders that eliminates this reference. Plaintiff believes that the reference
in the proposed Order is correct. Even in the language the Defendant quotes regard: ng the arbitration
provision on page 7 of his Memorandum states that "any Dispute. . . will be settled in accordance
with the terms of the Arbitration Program at the election of any party.. .Any party to a dispute may
by summary proceeding bring any action in Court to compel arbitration of any dispute." Thus,
contrary to Defendant's current representation to the Court, the Order is not factually incorrect
because the contract between the parties provides that the arbitration provision only comes into
effect when an election is made by a party. Defendant never made such an election and cannot
belatedly make an election after the default judgment has been entered.
Lastly, Defendant attempts to claim that the so called lender liability claims against Wells
Fargo constituted a meritorious defense is another improper objection. Defendant never set forth
any facts which would support his alleged claim of lender liability and barely mentioned the claim
in his Motion to Set Aside Default or in his reply. Defendant's feeble attempt to oppose the form
of the proposed Order by arguing a meritorious defense after failing with the Arbitration defense in
objecting to the proposed order is absurd. This Court has held that Defendant did not have a
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meritorious defense to the subject matter. Therefore, Defendant's newest attempt to convince this
Court of an adequate defense is improper and should be denied.

•

-

CONCLUSION
Defendant's objections to the Proposed Orders submitted by Wells Fargo are all baseless and
without merit. This Court held in the Minute Entry that Defendant's Motion to Set Aside is denied
based upon the reasons set forth in Wells Fargo's Opposition. The Proposed Orders simply set forth
the reasons which were given in the Opposition. As an accommodation to resolving the Order as
soon as possible, Plaintiff has also deleted the reference to the arbitration provision in the Order.
Plaintiff requests the Court to deny Defendant's objections to the Order, and sign and enter the
Order. The only question properly before this Court is whether attorneys fees should be awarded.
Because the Court's Minute Entry was silent on the issue, Wells Fargo again submits two Proposed
Orders for this Court convenience on this issue. Plaintiff urges the Court to award attorneys fees in
light of the deceptive nature 0/Defendant's Motion to set Aside the Default Judgment.
DATED this
lis >—^
J^ day of February, 2000.
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.

irk S.^wan
Attorney for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

Z 3 day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail, postage
prepaid and addressed as follows:
Mark A. Larsen
Jerome H. Mooney III
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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MarkS. Swan-3873
Shane W. Norris - 8097
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 561-47^0
Attorneys for Plai nti ff
Wells Fargo Bar*' N - A IN THE TtfIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALf LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
Plaintiff

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT

V.

Civil No. 990908206
MICHAEL J. KEARNS,
Defendant.

Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendant's Moti on t 0 Set Aside Default Judgment came before this Court as a result of the
parties' Notice to Submit- Plaintiff filed a principal Memorandum and Affidavit, Defendant filed
a Responsive Memorand um

an

- Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum. Though oral argument was

requested, the Court finds that oral argument would not substantially assist the Court in making a
ruling on Defendant's MO^on. Therefore, the Court having fully reviewed Defendant's Motion and
the resulting pleadines along with the Court record in this matter, the Court hereby enters the
following ruling:
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1.

On December 27,1999, Defendantu filed
niea aMotion
a Motion to
to Set
Set Aside
Aside the
tne Default
Uetauit Judgment,
Judgment,

Sep*"

OA*2

which Judgment was signed by this Court Dceombcr 23, 1999.

ftUJ^

^falA^

Defendant's Motion was

accompanied by a supporting Memorandum of Defendant Michael Kearns.
2.

Defendant asserted that his failure to respond to Plaintiffs Complaint in a timely

fashion was due to excusable neglect as that term is set forth in Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

,.

3.

Defendant has failed to show excusable neglect.

4.

Defendant has further failed to show that he has a meritorious defense to the matters

raised in PlaintifFs Complaint. Particularly, the Defendant's claim that the matter should have been
arbitrated is not persuasive as the arbitration provision under the Note sued upon by Plaintiff
required a formal election of arbitration to be made by Defendant before the Court in the civil action,
which did not occur in this case.
5.

Defendant's Motion to set Aside the Default Judgment is denied,

DATED this

(

day of February, 2000.
BY THE COURT;

.

HONORABLE SANDRA N. PEULER
Third Judicial District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVIrF
I hereby certify that on the _ fO day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and unsigned correct
copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
Mark A. Larsen
Jerome H. Mooney HI
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of February, 20Q0,1 caused a true and signed correct

copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
Mark A. Larsen
Jerome H. Mooney III
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Mark S. Swan
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047-4139
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Tab 5

E NUMBER 990908206 Debt Co"-_ Action
Amount Credit:
Balance:

0-°°
°- uu

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT
Amount'pue:
20.00
Amount Padd:
2 0.00
Amount Credit:
u.
Q uu
Balance:
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: WRIT OF EXECUTION
Amount Due:
20.00
Amount Paid:
20.00
Amount Credit:
u.
u uu
Balance:
£E NOTE
.OCEEDINGS
i-09-99
i-13-99
i-13-99
1-13-99
i-13-99

Case filed by jamess
Judge PEULER assigned.
Filed: Complaint 10K-MORE
l2^00
Fee Account created
^°^±L
Received:
Paym
COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
® S L ? ? ? w r 10K MORE
Note: Code Description: f ^ ™ ^ ° K M ° R E
3-03-99 Filed return: Summons (20 day) R e t u r n
Party Served: KEARNSf MICHAEL J
Service Date: August 23, iy»» rrte.tt,
9-22-99 Filed: Affidavit .of Attorney's Fees and Costs
3-22-99 Filed: Default Certificate
1-22-99 Default Judgment sent to Judge Peuie9-23-99 Filed order: Default Judgment
Judge speuler
Signed September 23,-199^
9-23-99 Case Disposition is Jdmt default cleric
Disposition Judge is SANDRA PEULER
9-27-99 Judgment #1 Entered
Creditor: WELLS FARGO BANK NA
Debtor:
MICHAEL J KEARNS
266,351.85 Principal
5,094.18 Interest
944.00 Attorneys Fee's
272,390.03 Judgment Grand Total
9-27-99 Filed judgment: Default Judgment Q
Judge speuler
Signed September 23, 1999
9-30-99 Issued: Abstract of Judgment
Clerk nancyka

u
Tinted: 10/05/99 11:17:48

P a 9S

jamess
jamess
jamess
jamess

120.00

jamess
devonyag
ae o y g
devonvacr
devonya!
devonyag
Icathvq
kathya
' kathva
alicew

alicew
nancyka
J

